On Maintaining Concentration
Peter Milne (this issue, [I] ) has produced a neat counterexample to my conjecture in [2] that every sequent provable in the system IR of intuitionistic relevant logic is a substitution instance of an intuitionistically valid sequent that has no intuitionistically valid proper subsequent. While the Popperian in me rejoices, the relevantist/intuitionist in me might have to resign itself with disappointment to the prospect that the conjecture might not hold for any system worthy of the title of intuitionistic relevant logic. Now while I do not think the truth of the conjecture is essential to IR, it would still be welcome if it were so. What, then, can be done to save the situation in the light of Milne Ironically, the implemented proof-finding algorithm for propositional IR developed in Autologic manages to maintain concentration in a way that would make the little proof O above impossible for the algorithm to 'dis~over'.What has been overlooked in the proof theory, but not in the proof-finding algorithm, is the need to impose certain explicit conditions on the rule of v-Elimination in order to maintain concentration. These ' For the rules of IR for -, v and & see (31; for the rules for the full system with > as well, see (41. Dov Gabbay was the first to suggest that the specification of a proof-finding algorithm might be taken as part of the overall specification of the very identity of the logical system in question. The interesting philosophical implications of this proposal deserve discussion in a separate paper. extra conditions do no damage to the 'completeness' of IR vis-a-vis its parent system I of ordinary intuitionistic logic; and they ensure that unnecessarily complex proofs are not served up, and that Milne's counterexample is obviated.
But how, one might ask, can one avoid Milne's counterexample and still maintain that the relevant system IR is 'complete' vis-a-vis the parent system I of ordinary intuitionistic logic? The main goal in the quest for 'completeness' was that a theorem of the following form should hold, for the system IR that one finally favoured:
Theorem3:If A can be deduced in I from the set X of assumptions, then either A or 1 (absurdity) can be deduced in IR from some subset of X This theorem guarantees epistemicgain from the relevantizing effect of IR. It means that nothing, from the intuitionist's point of view, is lost. In particular, every intuitionistically inconsistent set is provably inconsistent in IR; every intuitionistic theorem is a theorem of IR; and every intuitionistic consequence of an intuitionistically consistent set of assumptions can be deduced from (some subset of) that set of assumptions in IR. So long as the theorem just stated holds for the system IR, we can say 'good riddance' to anything we 'lose' in the move from I to IR. I shall now repair the lapse of concentration in my earlier formulation of the proof system I gave for IR, by supplying some obvious and sensible precautions against irrelevance when applying one's inference rules. The tightening of the allowable connections between sets of premisses, and conclusions drawn from them, will not impair the main theorem. The new system IR resulting from the extra conditions to be imposed is one for which that theorem holds. The extra conditions, as already mentioned, are ones that it is prudent to adopt in automated proof-search, where a deductive problem of the form X?-A is solved as soon as one has produced a proof either of A or of 1from any subset of X.
The idea is really very simple:
(yl) In any application of a rule of inference R to immediate subproofs II,,...,n, to obtain a proof of A from X, we must ensure that the set of undischarged assumptions of any of the subproofs niwhose conclusion happens to be either A or 1is not a subset of X.
For, if some such subproof nihad either A or 1as its conclusion, and had its set of premisses Ai included in X, then niitself would be a solution to the deductive problem X?-A. It would accordingly be both unnecessary I first proved this theorem for full first-order logic in 1987. The proof is in [S] .
and prolix to seek to apply the rule of inference R to 'build up' a proof of A from X. The effort would be wasted, and the deductive insight afforded by niwould be obscured.
Let this condition (yl) now be imposed uniformly on all applications of rules of inference in IR -just as we impose uniformly the condition that proofs in IR should be in normal form. It is clear that this is not an ad hoc move. So far I have said nothing addressed to Milne's counterexample in particular. My new and explicit proof-theoretical condition is motivated solely by the desire to avoid, by pretty obvious means, the effects of dilution, within proofs, of results 'already proved' in the earlier innards of those proofs. The condition has already been incorporated in the design of efficient proof-search algorithms, so one may as well incorporate it into the proof theory too. When we look at the effect of our new requirement (yl) on the proof O given above of Milne's counterexample, we see that the final step of O would no longer count as correct. For, this final step of v-Elimination is proposed in order to obtain a proof of A & B 'from' A, B, A v B. Before we can take that final step, however, our new condition (yl) enjoins us to check whether any of the subordinate proofs do not already establish that result But it turns out that both of the subordinate proofs in question (which happen to be identical) establish the subsequent A, B : A & B of the 'overall' sequent A, B, A v B : A&B, which it would be the supposed achievement of the contemplated final application of the rule of v-Elimination to have established. We can therefore forswear the extended 'proof' with a clear conscience; we can maintain concentration.
Will this new requirement (yl), however, serve to rule out even, Milnetype example? I think that it can be made to, with a little extra care. (yl) needs to go hand-in-hand with two further conditions (yz) and (y3), concerning the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction, which I shall now motivate before formulating them below. Consider the proof If we imagine ourselves working down from the top within Z, reaching the point at which we have the two subproofs for the final step of v-Elimination, we find that we have, it seems, satisfied the new condition (yl) to be guided by considerations of relevance. What we do, rather, is (in natural deduction terms) work both upwards and downwards. In Autologic I developed a version of natural deduction that would make this feature of proof-search more transparent. I called the new system 'hybrid7 because it combines the virtues of the natural deduction system with those of the sequent system, and with none of their respective drawbacks. In the hybrid system major premisses for eliminations stand proud at tops of branches, with no sentences 'above' them. The hybrid system has its rules of &-Elimination and >-Elimination, like the usual rule of v-Elimination, stated in a 'parallel' form rather than their conventional 'serial7 form:
Here the discharge notation means that at least one of A or B must have been used as assumptions within the subordinate proof of C; and the application of the rule discharges all assumption occurrences of A and of B within that subordinate proof.
Here the discharge notation means that B must have been used as an assumptions within the 'major' subordinate proof; and the application of the rule discharges all such assumption occurrences of B.
Let us now see the effect of re-framing the rule of &-E this way. It might at first seem disappointing, and appear not to achieve anything for us in the way of blocks to Milne-type examples. For here is a re-formulation of the proof E most recently given, using the new form of &-E: But, as the designer of automated proof search will be quick to point out, this proof ll is unnecessarily prolix, and should not be aimed at by an efficient proof-finding algorithm. One should, rather, take advantage of the new iower afforded by the parallel form of &-E to discharge assumptions 'at one stroke'. A proof that does this is the following:
Note, however, that the step of v-Elimination in this 'proof' 2 would violate the new condition (y,) that I have imposed in the interest of maintaining concentration. On finding thus that it is impossible to proceed via v-Elimination, one would try instead to prove A & B at its upper occurrence by &-Introduction from the other available premisses, namely A, B. This one can do in one step, so the resulting proof would be:
Have we reached an impasse? We appear to have, in the new system of IR, one proof (ll)of A v B, B & A : A & B that goes through without violating (y,), and one attempted 'proof' (2)that doesn't go through, because it does violate (yl). What has been achieved?
My reply is that in the interests of maintaining concentration we are still at liberty to impose any structural conditions we like on proofs (that is, on the application of rules of inference) -provided only that these conditions are decidable, and that imposing them does not confute the Theorem stated above. Now I want to rule out ll as well as 2. So a new structural condition that I would like to impose -one which merely registers, in the proof theory, the insights involved in computational proof-search -is the following:
(y2) Applications of &-E should be 'as low down as they can possibly be, but no further down than they ought to be'. The new condition (y2) can be thought of as helping to specify a more stringent notion of normal form. In ordinary intuitionistic logic, of course, restriction of proofs to these more stringent normal forms involves no loss of completeness. For every proof in ordinary normal form can be re-cast so as to have all its steps of &-E shuffled down as far as possible. A step of &-E will shuffle down past any rule-application that does not discharge the major premiss of that step of &-E. When, however, we come to relevantize so as to obtain a satisfactory version of IR, this extra ingredient (y2) in the specification of normal form becomes useful in maintaining concentration. The effect will be achieved by restricting applications of rules of inference in such a way as to prevent applications of &-E from occurring 'too high up' -or, correspondingly, 'too late' during bottom-up search in the hybrid system. So another way of stating our new condition is as follows: There is a simple way, however, to show how the illicit dilution within the proof Q has been effected. Simply apply to Q the transformation that guarantees that any proof ending with a step of v-E applied to subproofs at least one of which ends with &-I can be turned into a proof ending with &-I whose subproofs end with v-E:
The reader can easily check that the transformation is also available when one of the case-proofs of C & D is replaced by a proof of absurdity.) The result of applying this transformation to the Milne-proof Q is:
in which it is now conspicuous that the applications of v-E are illicit. For they violate the requirement that the relevant case assumption should actually have been used, and be available for discharge, within each case proof.
In the leftmost step of v-E the second 'case proof' is just --A, with no use Another way of formulating this requirement within proof theory is as follows:
(y3) In the usual inductive definition of proof, we will require that v-E may not be applied to subproofs ending with an application of &-I, and that applications of 3 -E may not be applied with a major subproof that ends with an application of &-I
In cases where we have a conjunctive conclusion and at least one conjunction among the premisses, (yz) is to have precedence over (y,) . That is, we shall deal with the conjunctive premiss first. The combined force of (yz) and ( Indeed, it is instructive to look once again at all three of the closet diluters that have been causing the They are:
Note how each of these 'proofs' has steps of &-I occurring above a step of v-E. So (y3) alone is an effective block against all of them. It will do no harm, however, to have both (y,) and (y2) up our sleeves as well.
O N MAINTAINING CONCENTRATION IS I
Our response so far to the three proofs above has been to say 'Aha! they all have &-I occurring too low down.' Another would be to say 'Ah yesbut, by the same token, they all have v-E occurring too high up.' Limitations of space prevent me from writing out in full here all the transformations on proofs that suffice to warrant my next claim, so I shall simply assert it, leaving its (renewed) verification to the interested reader as an exercise. The claim is that applications of v-E in IR proofs can always be shuffled upwards in the following circumstances:
1. one of the minor case-proofs ends with absurdity, and the other ends with an introduction; That is to say: we should make their conclusions as nearly atomic as is possible. (y,) rules out the following modification Poof 52 (due again to Peter Milne, private correspondence), which would escape the strictures of (~11, (~2 ) and (~3 ) :
(y,) would oblige us to shuffle the terminal step of v-E up past the steps of v-I in the case proofs. Then (y,) (and indeed (y3)) would oblige us to shuffle the step of v-E further up again, past the steps of &-I. By that stage the resulting applications of v-E would be illicit, for they would (as we saw earlier with the transform of 52) violate the requirement that the relevant case assumption should actually have been used, and be available for discharge, within each case proof. So, since obligatory transformations on the wouldbe proof Q0 turn it into something ill-formed, Q0 itself is ill-formed.
I propose therefore that all the rules of IR should be just as laid out in Autologic, only subject to our further provisos (y,), (y2), (y3) and (y4). Call the new system IR[y]. Can we now rest assured that Milne-type counterexamples cannot arise for IR[y]? I hesitate to say so. The Popperian within me conjectures thus; while the relevantist/intuitionist within me stands ready to seek new conditions (yi) that will avoid dilution, yet preserve our Theorem, if new counterexamples to this new conjecture are produced to show that such conditions will be required. In the absence of a proof of the conjecture, that is the best one can do. It is always a battle to maintain concentration. 
